Istanbul Center and The Sam Nunn School of International Affairs

were honored to host Morton Abramowitz, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey. His talk was titled  “Where does Turkey belong?  Western perceptions of Turkish foreign policy and the American response.”

This event was co-sponsored by The Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. 

A reprint of the Ambassador's remarks are below with his express consent. You may also watch the entire presentation at the Atlanta Forum Network by clicking here.

Morton Abramowitz, Feb. 25,2010

I am always pleased to talk Turkey. It was a great diplomatic assignment and the country endlessly fascinates me. There is always something going on, Indeed sometimes I think Turkey changes by the day.  I have tried hard to keep up with developments there including visiting almost every year, when I find someone to pay my way.

Turkey has taken off since the end of the cold war: profound economic and social change and major strides in making the country more democratic. Nevertheless, it still has a long way to go to meet EU accession requirements. A good bit of Turkey remains third world. I have always believed, however simplistic, that as long as Turkey grows 5-6 percent a year it will get into the EU by the end of this decade. Unfortunately, given Europe’s reticence and Turkey’s development, I think Turks increasingly wonder whether they really want to join the EU.

The country is far more vibrant and open, and public discussion is light years ahead of my time in Ankara twenty years ago. Some subjects such as the question of Armenian genocide in World War I and Kurds remain touchy issues, but they are openly discussed now and in the case of Turkey’s Kurds there is serious consideration of policy changes. Remarkably, the military, still the most respected institution in Turkey and the generator of four coups, is being seriously criticized, and many \retired offices this past year have been arrested or questioned over plotting against the government.  A small newspaper—Taraf— repeatedly publishes the military’s intimate secrets and gets away with it. Its editors would have been imprisoned for life a decade ago.

Indeed this week produced even greater tensions. The government seems to be pushing the military against the wall by brining into custody some fifty retired officers but some of them remarkably former top commanders. This is a unique situation and all sorts of rumors are flying around like the top brass resigning en masse in reaction. The highest civilian and military officials have been urgently meeting in apparent efforts to contain the storm, raising questions whether the problem is justice or politics. From here it is unclear where all this is going, but it appears to be an extraordinary moment in modern Turkish history,

In talking about Turkey today I will do it by responding to some current American discussion of Turkey and our bilateral relations and give you my take on that discussion.

Even though Turkey is a long time ally, there is a growing perception, particularly among our conservative cognoscenti, that domestically the Justice and Development  Party (AKP) government is out to destroy the power of the military and make Turkey not an Islamic state but a more conservative, religiously oriented state with much greater public manifestations of Islam. Some fear more extreme internal religious developments and a very authoritarian government emerging if the military is completely defanged as the guardian of Turkish secularism. I can imagine what they are saying today. Many holding this view believe that on foreign policy the AKP is detaching Turkey from its Western moorings and focusing more on ties to the Muslim Middle East and Russia and showing less interest in joining the EU and maintaining close ties to the U.S.

For the moment let me say briefly that while the AKP government, of course,  has made changes in domestic and foreign policy that might lend support to those views, such basic judgments are, I believe, over done, and their concerns simply do not take into account the complexity of Turkey and its rapid development. I will focus on foreign policy, but a few more comments first on the domestic dimension

--The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is due to the failure of Turkey’s main stream parties but more fundamentally to Turkey’s structural changes: the growth of the economy, an enlarged non-Istanbul entrepreneurship, and the vast movement of poorer, more devout people from country to city. The AKP, which rose out of an older fundamentalist party, has given voice to these demographic elements that rarely had one, and in doing so has done much to make Turkey an open, more vibrant and democratic country. They have severely reduced the ability of the military, their main political enemy, to intervene in politics through coups. This ongoing effort, however, has polarized the country, particularly those who believe the army is essential to preserving Turkey’s traditional secularism and providing balance in a conflicted society. The events this week will deepen the polarization, as the government and military seemingly scramble to contain it. AKP has gone far because it is a majority party, accelerating change, and intent on making Turkey a greater economic and political player in the world.

---While surviving  efforts so far by the military and the judiciary to bring the government down, the AKP’s dynamism has diminished the past two years, partly because of world recession but also because they have talked much but accomplished little on promised and most difficult fundamental reforms like a new constitution to replace the authoritarian military-bestowed constitution and real measures to deal with its Kurds. Rather they have pulled back, fearing the political fallout of their controversial reform efforts.

--One last point. Life changes. So do politics in Turkey, however ineffective Turkey’s opposition parties have been. Yes, PM Erdogan dominates the scene like a colossus, he is an extraordinary dynamic politician, but he is also viewed as increasingly authoritarian and destructive of a free media, polemical, and prone to risk-taking including now his defense establishment. The AKP’s political position remains strong, but its popularity is diminishing. Conceivably this week’s event could spur Mr. Erdogan to early parliamentary elections, although he has denied it. Should he wait till the present parliament’s time is up economics will likely play a bigger part in determining the outcome of the next elections. The free ride opposition parties have given AKP, particularly on economic matters, is likely to end. The country is increasingly at war with itself and the public tone is acrimonious.  Dominant as they now are, the AKP could well continue its drift downward, setting the stage for an election producing a coalition government. Political life in Turkey can turn fickle—not unlike what we see in the US today.

Foreign policy under the AKP is vastly different and very lively, a far cry from the stagnancy of the cold war. Both Erdogan and his Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, are enormously active, incessantly travelling, and trying to convey to the Turkish public and the world Turkey’s new dynamism and importance.  Turkish involvement and influence extends far these days—NATO, and over the last decade to the Caucasus, the Middle East, Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan. Ankara’s ambitions are limited by Turkey’s internal weaknesses. But it remains the strongest power in the area.

Let me briefly discuss a few specifics of that diplomatic revolution that have caused heartburn here. They are in the Middle East-- Iran, Syria, and Israel, and in Russia. On the issue currently most important to both countries--Iraq--Turkey has made radical changes in policy helpful to our interests. Somehow that development seems to get little attention from conservatives, who remain still deeply interested in Iraq. So let me start with Iraq, which since the first Gulf War has been the most acrimonious issue in US-Turkey relations. The second Gulf war generated the vast decline in American popularity in Turkey.

The two wars produced a nightmare for Turkey—the possibly huge impact on Kurdish nationalism and Turkey’s own Kurds from the growth of a self-governing Kurdish entity in northern Iraq and the possibility it could become independent if Iraq descended into chaos. This has been a fear of every Turkish government since the allies established a safe haven area in Iraq for Kurds after the first Gulf War. Turkey’s worse fears seemed to come true after Saddam’s fall and the inability to create an effective Iraq government. For seven years the Turks made believe Iraqi Kurdistan did not exist except for trade, but over the past year they changed course and developed a serious relationship. To a great extent that came from the realization that the Americans were leaving Iraq and Turkey would be better served by a good relationship with the Kurds in helping preserve Iraq’s unity. The U.S. works closely with Turkey to preserve Iraq’s unity.

It is Turkey’s greater involvement in the rest of the Middle East that has caused the biggest unhappiness here.  Ankara has mounted a sustained and vigorous effort to improve relations with its neighbors (usually described as “zero problems” with neighbors) and, importantly, deepen economic ties with all Arab countries, the latter a focus of the Prime Minister’s personal efforts. They built on Turkey’s Muslim character to help advance relations with often unfriendly neighbors. Turkey has especially deepened economic and political relations with Assad’s Syria, including a free visa regime, and tried but failed to carry on indirect peace negotiations between Syria and Israel. The U.S., it might be noted, this past week in a far smaller but similar vein sent an ambassador back to Syria after five years and eliminated some trade sanctions against Syria. Throughout the Arab world Turkish leader have showed the flag and encouraged Arab investment in Turkey. They are having some success in reversing the Arabs’ historical animosity to the Turks.

The most troublesome issue, as American skeptics point out, is Iran, a state rarely trusted by Turks. Living next to a powerful neighbor and historical antagonist but interested in trade and investment Turkey has recently developed a different perspective than the U.S., and the Obama administration has not discouraged Ankara from pursuing it, Turkey certainly does not want Iran to acquire nukes, which would raise major security concerns. However, in pursuing better relations it has apparently accepted Iran’s denial that it seeks a nuclear weapons capability, and even sort of out loud allowed for Iran to have such a weapon since Israel has one. Recently, top Turkish leaders have pursued a mediating role between Iran and the West and they assert that Iran wants to resolve the nuclear issue through negotiations.. Turkey is presently a Security Council member and will have to vote on any sanctions measure. It is quite possible depending on its nature that Turkey will abstain on any UN resolutions for sanctions on Iran. In short trouble looms ahead between us.  Iran is clearly a case of conflicting interests and different perceptions. I tend to believe, hopefully wrongly, that Iran is using Turkey to muddy the waters and perpetuate nuclear negotiations.

The issue that has inflamed many conservatives and Turkey’s strong supporters in the American Jewish community has been its handling of Israel. While Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel, relations were not close and there has been little public support of Israel in Turkey. In the nineties Turkish-Israeli relations expanded in all fields--defense and intelligence, economics, tourism and others-- led in great part by the military, who then saw Syria and Iran as the threats to Turkey, but that did not change popular perspectives. The relationship has been diminishing with Turkish activism in the Middle East under the AKP.. Acrimony took over last year with the Prime Minister’s rage over Israel’s invasion of Gaza, Mr. Erdogan’s continuing public denunciations and the sudden disinviting of Israel to a military exercise were popular in Turkey, fanned anti -Israel sentiments and generated considerable expressions of anti-Semitism. Israel was dismayed by the loss of support of its main Muslim friend and there were some harsh reactions. However, Israel quickly recognized the importance of its relations with Turkey and sought to limit damage. Turkish tempers also have cooled.  We are not likely to see relations return to the level of the nineties, but both countries pragmatically want to sustain the present level of economic and diplomatic relations. Unhappiness with Israel over Gaza, however, could explode again.

One aspect of Turkish behavior on these issues raises questions of hypocrisy and could hurt Turkey’s standing in the West.  While characterizing Israel behavior in Gaza as genocide, Mr. Erdogan has publicly embraced Sudanese leader Bashir, an indicted war criminal, and denied mass atrocities in Darfur, stating Muslims don’t commit genocide. Nor has his quick embrace of the Iranian elections and his silence over the subsequent crackdown won him admiration in the West. Erdogan is no proponent of democracy and human right in his diplomacy and that is duly noted. On the other hand he seeks to be an intermediary between Iran and the West and does not want to endanger that effort.

Lastly and briefly is Russia where eyebrows have also been raised here. Turkey’s relations with Russia are of course different than during the cold war. Turkey has no love for Putin’s Russia and remains a dedicated NATO member. But today economics rules: the major development in Turkish-Russian relations has been the enormous dependence on Russia for energy. That has made Russia Turkey’s major trading partner, far exceeding Turkey’s trade with the U.S. In its efforts to become an energy hub, Turkey tries to satisfy both Russia and its \Western partners by seeking pipelines that use Russian energy but also helping develop ones not involving Russian participation. Turkey has also been circumspect in its political relations with Russia. It was no champion of Georgia and was cautious about Ukranian membership in NATO, not the only country in NATO to show caution,

The bottom line: Turkey has redefined its interests and with the exception of Iran much of it makes sense. Why should Turkey stay the same when their world is changing and not pursue changing interests?

Looking ahead, I think our relations will remain close. Certainly the US wants to work together with a rising Turkey and so does Turkey. But the next few years can also be difficult.   US-Turkey relations will be tested in Iraq and whether it stays together.  Profound Iraqi internal problems must be overcome and the end is not apparent. The manner of our leaving Iraq will be critical to Turkey. Iran may test our relations even sooner.

The most immediate problem, however, is the Armenian genocide issue. A resolution invariably comes up in Congress in March declaring the killings of vast numbers of Armenians in 1915 a genocide. The Turkish government has bitterly resented this and has fought hard and successfully over many hears to prevent a resolution passing. Its passage in even one house, every Turkish government has declared, would enormously harm relations. It is not clear what the Turkish government will actually do. The executive branch has always fought the resolution on national security grounds. Congress is likely to pass it this year if the President does not get involved; he himself during the 2008 campaign declared the events of 1915 a genocide. The administration had strongly worked for reconciliation protocols between Armenia and Turkey to open the border and establish relations, in part with the expectation that would put off any genocide resolution. Bu Parliamentary approval in Turkey has stalled and that hope now appears dim before the resolution comes up in the Congress. Recent comments by Secretary Clinton indicate that the administration will resist the resolution on grounds that it will interfere with the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey

Let me close with some personal reflections on bilateral relations.  Both countries’ leadership incessantly talk of our close relations, our common values, and our shared views, and they like to use the term “strategic relationship”  to demonstrate the importance of our relations. Indeed there is much truth to that despite huge hiccups like Iraq. Turkey has been a real concern of the executive branch, which has worked hard to maintain strong ties and to facilitate Turkey’s entrance into Europe. Turks also wants close relations. They are important politically even if most Turks dislike the U.S. A deterioration in relations with Washington would give any Turkish government domestic political headaches.

The fact, however, is that our relationship remains close but its substance changing.  The end of the Soviet Union has reduced Turkey’s dependence on the U.S. for security and military ties—Iraq hardly constitutes a Soviet threat. Turkey still relies on the U.S. for defense modernization but it is broadening its sources of arms. Nor does the present American economic situation inspire the respect of yore. Turkey’s increasing independence is reflected in the active diplomacy already described, where Turkey pursues its own interests, sometimes with political movements like Hamas or countries we dislike. The U.S. has begun to recognize that change, notably with the arrival of Foreign Minister Davutoglu, and is adjusting to it—there has been no serious division yet, although Iran is creeping close to it. Washington encourages Ankara where its activities are helpful and tries to mitigate differences.

The atmosphere has also been strained for another reason: the huge Anti-Americanism in Turkey generated by the second Iraq war. According to recent polls attitudes toward the U.S. have been mired in the mid teens, the lowest for any American ally and most other nations. Not even the end of the Bush administration or Mr. Obama’s early visit to Turkey has changed that much. Public attitudes do not override national interests, but bad ones are not a good sustainable basis for relations. The Turkish government has shown little interest in trying to change public attitudes for an understandable reason—it would not be politically popular. Further the economic underpinnings of our relations are weak and by and large that can not be changed much by governments in private enterprise countries, Both governments have their work carved out and hopefully they will step up to it.   Turkey has a bright future, if it maintains internal stability and continues rapid growth.  The growing democracy of an overwhelmingly Muslim country, one which can join the EU, is a fundamental benefit to all. Turkey’s success will contribute to American interests and to world stability.

Indeed the most crucial issues are very difficult internal ones,

whether Turkey overcomes the  polarization that now grips the country, allowing it to proceed with fundamental reforms and resume its rapid rate of growth. That will be crucial to determine whether Turkey becomes part of the EU, a major member of the West, and a far more influential player internationally.

This event was organized as part of the Distinguished Speaker Series of Istanbul Center

in cooperation with The Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech.

Georgia Tech’s Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy is a part of

The Sam Nunn School of International Affairs.

www.cistp.gatech.edu 

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Morton Abramowitz

 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4217

Ambassador Abramowitz is a Senior Fellow at The Century Foundation. He retired in 1997 as President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and from the State Department in 1991. Ambassador Abramowitz also served in 1997-98 as Acting President of the International Crisis Group.

He joined the Foreign Service in 1960 after attending Stanford and Harvard, and serving in the United States Army. Prior to joining the Carnegie Endowment in August 1991, he was Ambassador to Turkey. He has also served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, United States Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations in Vienna, Ambassador to Thailand, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State. He also served in Hawaii as political advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. He has the permanent title of career ambassador.

He is the author (with Richard Moorsteen) of Remaking China Policy, 1972; Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers, 1972; East Asian Actors and Issues, 1991; and China: Can We Have a Policy?, 1997. He was the editor and part author in 2000 of a book of essays: Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy. His most recent book with Stephen Bosworth is Chasing The Sun: Rethinking East Asian Policy Since 1992, he has published numerous articles and essays on subjects ranging from American foreign policy to issues in the former Yugoslavia. They have been published in The New York Times, The Washington Post, Newsweek, Time, International Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs and many others.

He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the Joseph C. Wilson Award for International Service from the University of Rochester in 1980, and the President’s Award for Distinguished Federal Service in 1981, 1985, and 1988. He also was awarded the National Intelligence Medal in 1989, the Director General’s Cup of the Foreign Service in 1995, and the Award for Lifetime Contributions to American Diplomacy of the American Foreign Service Association. He serves on the board of many non profit organizations, including the International Rescue Committee and the National Endowment for Democracy.